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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
 
Our study investigates the relation between insider’s ownership and earnings 
quality, based on earnings management. We are using data from companies of the 
countries of the United States of America.  We exploit for our study the modified 
Jones model, developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) with a Cash Flow from 
Operations using the discretionary accruals method. Existing literature has 
documented that different kinds ownership structures affect in a different way the 
reported financial earnings and the earnings quality. Our survey examines the 
impacts of insiders’ ownership on earnings quality. Following, we employ two 
different measures to calculate earnings quality. Our findings were consistent as the 
aforementioned theory commanded. 
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1.Introduction 
 
The principal-agent problem is increasingly observed in companies all over the world. 
This occurs due to the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders 
because each part seeks to maximize its own value. The separation between 
ownership and control is one of the major characteristics of publicly traded companies 
in the United States and gives rise to principal-agent problems and conflicts between 
managers and outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Some agents may not act in the principal’s best 
interests. Moreover, they may manipulate earnings for their own benefit at the 
expense of other stakeholders. In accordance with agency theory, monitoring tools 
can be used, in order to mitigate opportunistic behaviors by managers. 
 
It goes without saying that accounting earnings have always been one of the major 
indicators of company’s financial performance. Agency conflicts are mitigated by 
accounting earnings because they align the interests of shareholders with those of 
outside shareholders or creditors (Bushman and Smith 2001). Earnings management 
occurs when managers intentionally influence the process of financial reporting. It is 
widely known that, over the past decades, there is an increasing interest concerning 
earnings quality. There is evidence that earnings management may affect negatively 
earnings quality and may weaken the credibility of financial reporting. This study 
investigates whether the quality of financial reporting can be affected by insiders’ 
ownership. 
 
It is worth mentioning that ownership structure could be a deterrent against earnings 
manipulation by the managers (Bushman and Smith 2001). However, as Warfield and 
Wild (1995) mentions, particular types of ownership structure could provide 
incentives to managers to manipulate earnings. 
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An ongoing problem in corporate America is the manipulation of financial statements. 
Incentives of managers give rise to financial accounting information reporting that 
deviates from the substance of underlying economic transactions to maximize private 
gains at the cost of shareholders or creditors (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003). The 
major reason that management manipulates financial statements is that many 
executives’ compensation is straightforwardly aligned with firm’s financial 
performance. Management can use several techniques to manipulate a company’s 
income statements, balance sheets and cash flows.   
 
There are two dominant ways to manipulate financial statements. The first one occurs 
when manipulated financial statements inflate current period earnings by using 
artificial revenues, or they deflate current period expenses. The second one arises 
when manipulated financial statements deflate the earnings of current period by 
decreasing revenue or increasing expenses. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the shareholders, creditors, and other users of financial 
statements are interested in financial reporting of high quality, which creates the 
obligation of effective contracting and monitoring. In turn, the demand for quality 
financial reporting creates incentives for firms to provide high-quality financial 
statements in order to secure better contracting terms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
 
Given all the aforementioned, the major purpose of this thesis paper is to investigate 
the relation between insiders’ ownership structure and the quality of earnings in USA, 
providing also evidence on the abnormal accruals and persistence of transitory loss 
components in earnings, contributing to the existing literature concerning insiders’ 
ownership and the effects on the quality of earnings across USA.  
 
In our examination we use a final sample of 587 existing listed S&P companies in USA 
and we examined their accounts over a 5-year period, from 2011 until 2016. We find 
evidence that on average insider ownership is significantly associated with higher 
earnings manipulation. Specifically, insiders’ ownership is associated with lower 
abnormal accruals and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings.  
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Insiders ownership could strengthen the communication between insiders and users 
of financial statements through higher-quality accounting earnings. The higher-quality 
accounting earnings may arise from shrinkage in the conflicts of interests between 
insiders and other shareholders by aligning their interests.  
 
Bearing all this in mind, we apply regression analysis, setting dependent variables and 
independent variables. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section 
reviews the existing literature on insiders’ ownership, not only in USA but also globally, 
and the effect on earnings quality. The hypothesis development is also included in this 
section. In section 3, we describe our research design. Moreover, the data sample 
used, the variables and the methodology are described in the fourth section. In the 
fifth section, we display our findings and we comment on our empirical results. Last 
but not least, the sixth section consists of our recommendations and conclusions. 
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2.Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
In this section, we review the existing literature on ownership structure and earnings 
quality. Then, we develop our hypothesis making the connection between insider’s 
ownership and the quality of earnings. 
 
We examine the related literature on earnings quality and ownership and the link 
between them. We consider the insider ownership structure as a company’s 
ownership structure in order to examine if it constitutes an effective monitoring tool 
for earnings management. How does insider’s ownership affect the quality of 
earnings? Then, we analyze earnings management and earnings quality. What are the 
factors, which affect earnings quality and what are the ways to measure earnings 
quality? These questions have been answered by several researches on earnings 
management and they provide some relevant evidence.  
 
2.1 Insiders’ ownership and The Quality of Earnings 
 
The relation between insider ownership and earnings quality probably fits in the realm 
of agency theory, in which insiders arrogate wealth from other shareholders by 
manipulating accounting earnings. As indicated by agency theory, there is an agency 
relationship between the principal and the agent in which there may be conflict of 
interests due to the fact of utility maximizing of each party (Jensen and Meckling 
1976), and as a result monitoring manager is crucial in order to assure reliable financial 
reporting. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling dispute that low levels of insider ownership 
mean an unprivileged alignment between management and stakeholders.  According 
to Healy (1985), managers with little ownership may have incentives to manage 
accounting numbers as a result they can increase earnings-based compensation or 
avoid debt covenants. Dechow et al. 1996 states that there is correlation between 
particular mechanisms of corporate governance and earnings quality, and as 
ownership structure is considered to be an important one, it could have a monitoring 
role in earnings management activities. Warfield and Wild (1995) examine the relation 
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between managerial ownership and earnings quality and conclude that higher 
managerial ownership reduces managers’ incentives to report accounting earnings 
that deviate from the substance of underlying economic transactions. Due to the fact 
that it is conceivable that insiders manipulate earnings for private gains at the cost of 
other shareholders, existing literature predicts that insider ownership affects the 
demand and supply of earnings quality in two contradicting ways: the entrenchment 
effect and the alignment effect. 
 
2.2 Insiders’ Ownership 
 
The literature on agency theory suggests that setting up particular incentives for the 
agent and monitoring managerial judgments are pivotal in ensuring the depletion of 
deviations from principal’s interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
 
Several studies such as that conducted by Fayoumi, Abuzayed and Alexander (2010) 
have shown that there is a positive and significant correlation between earnings 
management and insiders’ ownership. Cheng and Warfield (2005) revealed that 
insider ownership is correlated with higher levels of earnings management. These 
studies contradict the statements of Warfield et al. 1995 concerning the correlation 
between insider ownership and earnings management, which indicates that insider 
ownership, is correlated with lower levels of earnings management. 
 
Regarding the entrenchment approach of management, concentrated ownership 
creates incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from other 
shareholders. Managers control the earnings in order to increase their personal 
fortune (Cheng and Warfield 2005, Guirdy 1999, Heary 1985).  In this vein, managers 
with high shareholdings are benefited by keeping shares value high and increasing the 
value of their shares (Yang, Lai and Tan 2008). Consistent with the entrenchment 
effect this means that insiders, as controlling shareholders, may extract private 
benefits from the firm at the cost of minority shareholders. Moreover, managers, 
holding high shareholdings, are not in danger of punishment while they are achieving 
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their personal goals (Jensen and Fama (1983), Weisbach (1988)). In order to achieve 
their personal value maximizing, through improving their earnings and shares value, 
they use abnormal accruals. According to the management entrenchment effect, 
CEO’s high shareholdings may increase managerial incentive problems instead of 
decreasing them. As it is stated in Mitani (2010) and Al-Fayoumi (2010), the higher the 
managerial ownership, the more the earnings management.  According to Morck et 
al.1988, management entrenchment could occur when insider holdings are high. This 
is consistent with the notion that the higher the insiders holding of stocks are, the 
higher the managers seem to engage in manipulating their accounting information 
and smoothing their income. There is evidence that CEOs with high equity incentives 
are more likely to manipulate earnings. (Cheng and Warfield, (2005)). Moreover, Yang, 
Lai and Tan (2008) state that managers who own a high number of shares would be 
benefited by manipulated accounting earnings. Taking all these in consideration, the 
entrenchment effect predicts that insiders owned firms report earnings of lower 
quality because insiders may have greater incentives to manipulate earnings to 
increase their own benefits. 
The alignment effect predicts that the stronger corporate governance mitigates 
managers’ incentives to manipulate the reported earnings (Klein, 2002). Earnings are 
of lower quality if the incentives to report high -quality financial information are low 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Concerning to the alignment effect we observe actions by 
managers that decrease the information asymmetry between managers and owners 
and align both sides’ interests. Therefore, according to the alignment effect, insiders 
owned firms are less likely to expropriate wealth from other shareholders through 
earnings manipulation. The strong monitoring mechanisms which are observed, 
motivate insiders to report accounting earnings of high quality and in turn they reduce 
the cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2003). There is evidence consistent with 
the notion that the alignment effect provides incentives to the insiders for wealth 
maximization of all shareholders. Overall, the alignment effect predicts that insiders 
are constrained from opportunistically manipulating accounting earnings for private 
benefits. 
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As we have already seen, managers have incentives to manage earnings in order to 
maximize their personal ambitions. Warfield et al. (1995) find a negative relation 
between managerial stockholdings and the absolute value of abnormal accruals. They 
interpret their results as being consistent with managerial shareholdings acting as a 
disciplining mechanism (Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976)). In a 
similar vein, Morck et al. (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive 
relation between Tobin’s Q and inside director shareholdings. However, Healy (1985) 
presents evidence that CEOs manage earnings to maximize their bonuses. Aboody and 
Kasznik (2000) and Yermack (1997) show that CEOs manage investors’ earnings 
expectations downward prior to scheduled stock option award to increase the value 
of their awards, and Nagar et al. (2000) present evidence that a firm’s discretionary 
disclosure of accounting data is related to the form of the CEO’s compensation. If the 
CEO manages earnings to increase his overall compensation, then there will be a 
positive relation between CEO shareholdings and earnings management. Thus, no a 
priori prediction is made.  
Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) found evidence that insider-controlled firms in low 
percentage of investors countries are connected to more earnings management than 
in non-insider countries, but in high percentage of investors countries are associated 
with less earnings management. 
2.3 Earnings Management 
 
For starters, we present what we mean by earnings management. Earnings 
managements is the transaction that managers use in order to manipulate the process 
of financial reporting on purpose to obtain some private gain. On other words, 
according to Healy and Wahlen (1998), earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of 
the company. Managers have numerous ways to differ the financial reporting. For 
instance, they choose accounting methods for reporting the similar economic 
transaction, they mislead about the future economic performance and the last 
managers become more informative for user with costs and benefits.  
13 
 
 
Earnings management is generally realized through accruals manipulation 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006, Dechow et al., 1995) and real activities 
manipulation ( Roychowdhurry, 2006, Kim et al., 2012). Sugata Roychowdhury (2006) 
defines real activities manipulation as departures from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into believing 
certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of operations. 
These departures do not necessarily contribute to firm value even though they enable 
managers to meet reporting goals. Certain real activities manipulation methods, such 
as price discounts and reduction of discretionary expenditures, are possibly optimal 
actions in certain economic circumstances. 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) have analyzed that one of the major roles of accrual 
accounting is to flat temporary fluctuations in cash flows due to the fact that accrual 
accounting systems recognize economic events in firms’ financial statements 
independently of the timing of cash flows associated with these events. As it is stated 
by Dechow (1994), it is negatively related the accrual accounting and the cash flows. 
Although, recent study by Bushman, Lerman and Zhang (2016) stated that the 
correlation between accruals and cash flows has largely disappeared in the last years.  
According to Kim Lo, earnings management has a lot in common with earnings quality. 
Kim Lo (2008) indicates that highly managed earnings have low quality. However, the 
lack of earnings management is not adequate to guarantee high-quality earnings or 
high-quality accounting numbers more generally, because other elements contribute 
to the quality of earnings. For example, accountants fastidiously following a poor set 
of standards will generate low-quality financial reports. Even so, if we take these other 
contributing factors as constant, then we can draw a much closer connection between 
earnings management and earnings quality. While there are other interpretations of 
earnings quality, in the following discussion, to be consistent with Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008), high-quality earnings are conservative, while low-quality earnings are 
upwardly managed earnings. There are two basic categories: real earnings 
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management and accruals management through changes in estimates and accounting 
policies. 
 
Mitani (2010) analyzed the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and earnings management. He used two mechanisms: internal for managerial 
ownership, ownership concentration and executive stock option on earnings and on 
the other hand, external for institutional investors ownership, financial institutions 
and another corporation’s shareholding. About internal mechanism, his study was 
concluded that firms with higher managerial ownership are related to more earnings 
management but for external, firms with higher institutional investors ownership are 
associated with less earnings management. U-shaped relationship with earnings 
management for internal mechanism has the ownership concentration but for 
external mechanism has the financial institutions. 
2.4 Earnings Quality 
 
In accounting, earnings quality is the ability of reported earnings to predict a 
company’s future earnings. From previous researches they have concluded the 
following results. Based on previous literature, we analyze earnings quality according 
to discretionary accruals. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1995), Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Zang (2006) managers use both accruals based 
accounting and real activities methods to handle earnings management.  
Dechow et al. (2010) summarize the research on the changes in the properties of 
earnings over time. Earnings quality influence many parts of companies, either direct 
or indirect. For example, in Hutton, Miller and Skinner (2002) research conclude that 
managers' tendency to provide progressive statements significantly more often when 
they expect good news forecast earnings quality than when they disclose bad news 
forecast earnings quality. Lev and Zarowin (1999) and Collins et al. (1997) document a 
decline in the relevance of earnings, Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Dichev and Tang 
(2008) find increases in the volatility of earnings and Dichev and Tang (2008) find a 
decline in the matching of concurrent revenues and expenses. These studies interpret 
such trends as a decline in the quality of earnings. However, the literature disagrees 
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on whether it is changes in the real economy or changes in GAAP that have caused the 
declines in earnings quality. Regarding to Doyle (2007) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2008), internal control procedures are associated with less earnings management 
and that managerial turnover is a disciplining mechanism that mitigates earnings 
management. Higher quality earnings provide more information about the features of 
a firm’s financial performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a 
specific decision-maker.  
 
There are three features to note about earnings quality. At first, earnings quality is 
dependent on the decision-relevance of the information. To continue with, the quality 
of a reported earnings number depends on whether it is informative about the firm’s 
financial performance, many aspects of which are unobservable. Third, earnings 
quality is jointly determined by the relevance of underlying financial performance to 
the decision and by the ability of the accounting system to measure performance. This 
definition of earnings quality suggests that quality could be evaluated with respect to 
any decision that depends on an informative representation of financial performance. 
 
Moreover, earnings quality is analyzed into three categories: properties of earnings, 
investor responsiveness to earnings and external indicators of earnings 
misstatements. First, properties of earnings, includes earnings persistence and 
accruals, earnings smoothness, asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition; 
and target beating, in which the distance of earnings from a target is viewed as an 
indication of earnings management, and earnings management is assumed to erode 
earnings quality. In the second category investor responsiveness to earnings, includes 
papers that use an earnings response coefficient as a proxy for earnings quality and 
that relate the earnings response coefficient to another construct such as auditor 
quality. Finally, external indicators of earnings misstatements, includes Accounting 
and Auditing Enforcement Releases, restatements, and internal control procedure 
deficiencies reported under the Sarbanes Oxley Act, all of which are viewed as 
indicators of errors or earnings management.  
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According to Patricia Dechow, Weili Ge and Catherine Schrand (2010), they observe 
that although the quality of a firm’s earnings depends on both the firm’s financial 
performance and on the accounting system that measures it. In their research, they 
have relatively little evidence about how fundamental performance affects earnings 
quality. The literature often inadequately distinguishes the impact of fundamental 
performance on earnings quality from the impact of the measurement system. In 
addition, Patricia Dechow, Weili Ge and Catherine Schrand (2010) observe several 
potential sources of distortions that affect the ability of an accounting system to 
capture fundamental performance in reported earnings, their research generally 
focuses on distortions associated with implementation errors and earnings 
management. Moreover, they observe about the state of the literature viewed in its 
entirety is that there is no measure of earnings quality that is superior for all decision 
models. In their research, they use the Cronbach and Meehl model, in which the 
earnings quality proxy is the independent variable in the analysis and if earnings 
quality were a single construct and the proxies just measured it with varying degrees 
of accuracy, then they observe convergent validity across earnings quality proxies for 
the same determinant and to find that all the earnings quality proxies would have 
similar consequences.  
 
2.5 Insider ownership and Earnings Quality 
 
As we have already mentioned, several prior studies are involved in the relationship 
between insiders and earnings quality. Generally, insider ownership influences the 
procedure that a company monitor the earnings management activities. Warfield 
(1995) observed that insider ownership is one mechanism that control the 
opportunistic attitude of managers and the discretionary accruals are connected 
negative with insiders. 
 
Morck (1988) assert that managerial ownership is increasing, the available employees 
become less effective in aligning managers to take value maximizing decisions. This is 
because high ownership by management implies sufficient voting power to guarantee 
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future employment. SanchezBallesta and Garsa-Meca(2007) argue that highly 
managerial ownership are more likely to manipulate earnings, since this lack of market 
discipline may lead insiders to make accounting choices that are reflective to personal 
incentive rather than firm economic performance. 
Wang (2006) consider that ownership structure has an important impact on reported 
earnings. Nevertheless, the influence on insiders to managers is a debatable matter. 
Moreover, Mitra (2002) observe that insider ownership and earnings management are 
negatively correlated due to the information asymmetry between insiders and 
managers. Yeo (2007) conclude that as managerial ownership increases, earnings 
management may increase, as a result and the quality of earnings are increasing. 
Warfield et al., (1995) indicate that this positive relationship is expected if either 
accounting-based constraint mitigate managers' accounting choices or higher 
ownership results from difficulties in accounting numbers measuring performance as 
reflected in increased accruals variability. 
 
2.5.1 Accrual based and real activities earnings management 
 
Based on previous literature, there are two ways to perform earnings management:  
discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation. In the first method, Kothari 
(2015) noticed that managers exploit the fact that a section of total accruals are 
depended by their decision and their logical choice to converse their judgement as 
accounting and political choices. On the other hand, the definition of real activities 
earnings management is described by Roychowdury (2006) and is described as, 
“departures from normal operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to 
mislead at least some stakeholders into believing certain financial reporting goals have 
been met in the normal course of operations”. Accruals and real earnings 
management have many differences, such as GAAP principles regulate the accruals 
without existing same framework for real operations. As a result, Shust (2015) 
detected that accruals are easier to manipulate after the end of fiscal year, but, on the 
other hand, real activities are carried out to prior year. 
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2.5.2 Measurements of Earnings Quality 
 
While managers want to minimize earnings quality, there is no single way to measure 
earnings quality in the existing literature and we should use more than one parameter. 
As a result, in our research, we use two measurements in order to measure earnings 
quality: abnormal accruals and persistence of transitory loss components in earnings.  
 
Concerning to the first measurement, abnormal accruals, based on existing theory, 
accrual quality is increasing while firm size is increasing and is decreasing while the 
length of operating cycle, the total accruals and the standard deviation of sales and 
cash flow from operations are getting reduced. According to Patricia Dechow, Ilia 
Dichev (2001), they notice a strong negative relation between accrual quality and 
earnings persistence and consider that earnings quality is lower when actual accruals 
differ from expected accruals.  
 
About transitory loss components, Basu (1997) finds evidence that negative earnings 
changes are less persistent than positive earnings changes. He argues that the 
asymmetric persistence of negative earnings changes is the result of the conservative 
nature of accounting earnings. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) are based on Basu’s serial 
dependence model and conclude that the transitory loss components in earnings of 
public firms are less persistent than those of private firms in the U.K. market. 
 
Due to the fact that existing theories provide competing and alternative predictions 
concerning the effects of insider ownership on earnings quality, our study’s hypothesis 
states:  
 
H1 : Earnings Quality is systematically related to insider ownership. 
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3.Research Design  
 
In this section, we analyze in details the data, variables and model used. Firstly, we 
present the sample that was used in the empirical part. Subsequently, we describe 
fully the variables utilized, both dependent and independent. Lastly, it is reported the 
used methodology and models of our research. 
 
3.1 Measures of earnings quality 
 
In the existing literature, there is no single measure in order to estimate earnings 
quality. As such, we use two proxies for earnings quality: 1) Discretionary accruals and 
2) Persistence of transitory loss components in earnings.  
 
Firstly, the absolute value of abnormal accruals, is calculated using the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model, as modified by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Existing literature 
has provided evidence that earnings are of lower quality when there is a deviation 
between actual accruals and expected. According to the second measure which is 
persistence of transitory loss components in earnings, we adopt the Basu (1997) 
model as modified by Ball and Shivakumar (2005). We examine the relation between 
insider ownership and persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. More 
conservative reported earnings imply that earnings are of higher quality. 
 
3.1.1 Measurement of insider ownership  
 
The definition of insiders’ shares is the percentage of company’s shares owned by 
insiders (INSIDER_SHARES). 
 
Ke et al. (2002) presented that insiders own and trade upon knowledge of significant 
accounting disclosures and insiders' sales increase three to nine quarters before a 
break in a string of constant increasing in quarterly earnings. The same year, Beneish 
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and Vargus suggest that managers' contemporaneous trading can be used to assess 
the likelihood that the firms' accruals are of high or low quality. In their study, they 
examine whether insider trading is informative about earnings quality,  
 
3.2 Models 
3.2.1 Abnormal Accruals Analysis 
 
Based on previous studies, it is widely known that they used either Jones model (1991) 
or an adapted Jones model advanced by Dechow, Dichev (2002) to measure abnormal 
accruals. Jones presents a model that nondiscretionary accruals are constant and her 
model indicates how effects in a firm’s economic circumstances in nondiscretionary 
accruals, but in modified model nondiscretionary are estimated during the event 
period. For our study, we will use the modified Jonel model with the Cash Flow from 
operating activities. In a recent study, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) proved that the 
abnormal accruals are negatively correlated to cash flows and in their model argue 
that the conservative linear accruals model is not compared with the nonlinearity of 
abnormal procedure. As a result, the modified model by Ball and Shivakumar, adapted 
by Dechow and Dichen is very helpful to measure abnormal accruals. Specifically, the 
following nonlinear model is used to estimate abnormal accruals: 
 
ACC𝘵 = α₀+α₁*CF t+α₂*CF t-1 +α₃*CFt+1+α₄*DFCt +α₅ * DFCt * CFt +et (1) 
where: 
 
ACCt = total accruals at year t, scaled by average total assets at t, total accruals are 
earning before extraordinary items minus operating cash flows 
 
CFt = operating cash flows at t, scaled by average total assets at t 
 
CFt-1 = operating cash flows at t-1, scaled by average total assets at t 
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DCFt = one if the change of cash flows is less than zero (CFt-CFt-1<0), and zero otherwise 
 
et = error term. 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) present that accruals impact consequential to cash flows. 
Future cash flows are represented as future cash collections and past and current cash 
flows as cash which is paid or have already received. The equation DFC𝘵*CF𝘵 is the 
proxy for economic losses. The error term, e𝘵, provides the unexpected ration of total 
accruals that deviate from economic transactions. The residual value from this model 
is the Discretionary Accruals value, the estimate of unexpected or abnormal accruals 
from extended Jones model. The higher the level of discretionary accruals, the greater 
the level of earnings management. Model variables are divided by lagged total assets 
to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. 
 
 
 
The absolute value of the abnormal accruals from equation (1) is the proxy for 
earnings management. According to Bowen, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2003), 
Klein (2002), Reynolds and Francis (2000), Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995), the 
absolute value is used due to the fact that earnings management can involve either 
increase or decrease income accruals to achieve profits. A higher value means a 
greater level of earnings management or lower earnings quality. To test the 
correlation between insider ownership and earnings management, absolute value of 
abnormal accruals is assumed as the dependent variable.  
 
The following equation is used to estimate the absolute value of the abnormal 
accruals: 
 
ABS_ACC𝘵 = δ₀ + δ₁* INSIDER_SHARESt + δ₂* SIZEt + δ₃*ROAt + δ₄*LEVt + 
δ₅*GROWTH_SALESt + δ₆*PPEt+ δ₇*LOSS + et 
where: 
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ABS_ACCt = absolute value of abnormal accruals at t 
 
INSIDER_SHARESt = percentage of total common equity owned of managers 
 
SIZEt = natural log of total assets at t 
 
ROAt = net income at t divided by average total assets at t 
 
LEVt = firm leverage at t, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets  
 
GROWTH_SALESt = growth rate in sales at t 
 
PPEt = property, plant and equipment 
 
LOSS = one if net income<0, and zero otherwise 
 
et = error term. 
 
 
Prior to previous studies, Beker et al. (1998), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Reynolds and 
Francis (2000) argue that variables are included for profitability such as ROA, risk for 
bankruptcy such as LEV and LOSS and growth opportunities such as GROWTH_SALES. 
The coefficient on INSIDER_SHARES (δ1) tests the relation between insiders and the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals. A positive estimate will indicate that insiders 
have earnings that are of lower quality; however, if the estimate on δ1 is negative, it 
implies that insiders report earnings of higher quality. 
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3.2.2 Persistence of Transitory Loss Components in Earnings 
 
The second proxy of earnings quality is persistence of transitory loss components in 
earnings, measured by a serial dependence Basu’s model (1997) adopted by Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005).  As it is stated by Basu (1997), the positive earnings changes are 
more persistent than negative earnings changes (transitory loss components in 
earnings) and he argues that the asymmetric persistence of negative changes in 
earnings is the result of the conservative nature of accounting earnings. 
 
 The following model is adopted to investigate the relation between transitory loss 
components in earnings and insider ownership. 
 
ΔΝΙt = λ0+λ1 * DΔNIt-1+ λ2 * ΔΝIt-1+λ3 *ΔΝIt-1 ∗ DΔNIt-1+λ4INSIDER_SHARESt + λ5 * DΔNIt-
1∗INSIDER_SHARESt+λ6*ΔΝIt-1∗INSIDER_SHARESt+λ7*ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 
∗INSIDER_SHARESt +λ8*SIZEt +λ9*DΔΝIt-1 ∗SIZEt +λ10*ΔΝIt-1 ∗SIZEt +λ11*ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 
∗SIZEt  +λ12*LEVt  +λ13 *DΔΝIt-1 ∗LEVt +λ14*ΔΝIt-1 ∗LEVt +λ15ΔΝIt-1 ∗DΔΝIt-1∗ LEVt + et  
 
where: 
 
ΔΝΙt = change in net income before extraordinary items at t, scaled by average total 
assets at t-1 
 
ΔΝIt-1 = change in net income before extraordinary items at t-1, scaled by average total 
assets at t-1 
 
INSIDER_SHARESt = percentage of total common equity owned of managers 
 
SIZEt = natural log of total assets at t 
 
LEVt = firm leverage at t, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets 
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DΔNIt-1 = one if ΔΝIt-1 < 0, and zero otherwise. 
 
All other variables are the same as previously defined. Consistent with Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), the λ2 coefficient on ΔΝIt-1 is expected to be insignificant, and the 
λ3 coefficient on ΔΝIt-1∗DΔNIt-1 is expected to be negative and significant. The λ7 
coefficient on ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1∗INSIDER_SHARES capture the incremental persistence of 
transitory losses for insiders. A positive estimate on λ7  will indicate that transitory 
losses are more persistent which means that the quality of earnings is lower. A 
negative estimate on λ7 will indicate that insider ownership is associated with less 
persistent transitory losses which means that the accounting earnings are of higher 
quality. 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
As we noticed earlier in our study, managers want to maximize personal interests via 
managing earnings. Companies combine abnormal accruals, earnings informativeness 
and transitory loss components to manipulate earnings quality. For this reason, based 
on previous studies and our point of view, we have chosen the appropriate variables 
in order to identify if insider ownership is systematically to earnings quality. We 
include in our models the size and the leverage of our firms, the return on assets which 
present the financial performance of our firms and the growth of firm’s sales which it 
proves us the development of our companies. To continue with, we present a brief 
description of each one of variables. We comprised the value of abnormal accruals as 
dependent variable of earnings quality based on accruals method in OLS regression 
based on Cohen and Kim. Assumed as main control variable the shares which are 
managed by insiders. But this variable is not the only factor which have an effect on 
discretionary accruals. We add some several other control variables to examine 
different motivations which have an impact on the accounting decisions of the 
managers. 
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 The size of a company is calculated by its total assets. Assets are what a company 
owns, either tangible or intangible and anything that a company can control and have 
a beneficial impact such as property of buildings, lands, equipment, goodwill, 
patterns, money etc. 
 
The variable is defined from: SIZE = Logarithm of Total Assets. 
 
Return on assets presents profitability of firm. Chen (2007) noticed that businesses 
are more involved in earnings management. On the other hand, in earlier studies, 
Klein (2002) present that companies with high profitability have lower earnings 
management. This ratio helps managers and investors to observe how well take 
advantage of assets to invert into profits. ROA can separate the effect of ownership 
structures on earnings management after directing for the possible effect of financial 
performance. 
 
The control variable, ROA is calculated as : ROA = 
NET INCOME
TOTAL ASSETS
 
 
Leverage is a strategy of using borrowing money. Actually, leverage ratio is one of 
financial measurement to estimate how capital comes in the form of debts, 
specifically, loans. It is a way of company to find its financial obligations. Yang (2008) 
introduced that leverage and earnings quality have a negative relationship. 
  
The control variable, LEV is calculated as : LEV = 
lONG TERM DEBT
TOTAL ASSETS
 
 
Growth rate in sales presents us the firm’s growth opportunity. According to Wang 
(2006), managerial ownership has positive impact at sales. Roychowdhury (2006) 
noticed that firms which have by a great account in sales are expected better earnings 
management. The variable, Growth rate in sales is estimated at time t. 
  
The growth rate in sales is calculated as : 
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 GROWTH = 
𝐶𝑈𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆−𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
𝑃𝑅𝐼𝑂𝑅 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆
*100 
 
 
Property, plant and equipment are long-term assets which are not easily converted 
into cash. The modified Jones model means 
total accruals on the discrepancy between the change in incomes and the change in 
receivables as well as the level of total property, plant and equipment. 
 
In our regression, we use the dummy variable Loss. This variable is useful for our 
model to analyze company’s risk of bankruptcy. This variable takes the value of 1 if 
net income is negative and zero otherwise and estimate the assumption that firms 
confronting financial difficulties are involved in financial statements. 
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4. Sample Description 
 
In the beginning of this section, we explain in detail our data selection criteria 
 
4.1 Data and Sample selection 
 
As we mentioned before, in our study we try to examine the way which earnings 
quality is involved to insiders. All the necessary data for our procedure has been 
collected from the Bloomberg Database. All firms are trading in the USA. USA has a 
variety of companies and it is easy for us to find companies with the suitable 
characteristics to discover the relationship between insider shares and earnings 
quality. USA has a strong economy position with big and small firms which has insider 
managers with shares. We reject the companies of European Zone because the 
economic instability of European countries.  
 
Moreover, it is difficult to find out data from companies with financial services and 
banks. In our investigation, we prefer companies with clearly and unbiased data and 
we did not include unobtainable information. We prefer these companies because 
we would like to have a sample with reliability and not an unbalanced panel. Brooks 
(2012) mentions in his study “Balanced panel has the same of number of time-series 
observations for each cross-sectional unit, whereas an unbalanced panel would have 
some cross-sectional elements with fewer observations or observations at different 
times to others”. We use companies which belong to S&P 400, S&P 500 and S&P 600. 
 
To analyze better our data, we choose companies from different sectors. Our main 
goal is to have an equivalent number of companies in each sector, but it is difficult 
for us to find the same number of companies. The sectors presented on the following 
table are based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) system and we 
include in our research total 10 sectors. The Table 1 presents the total number of 
companies which we found out. Our initial sample consisted of 1376 companies 
operating in the USA and our testing sample after dropping companies with 
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unavailable data included 587 listed firms. Companies that appeared as financial 
services, banks or real estate are rejected. Moreover, are also rejected companies 
with lacking data and companies with missing data. Moreover, in the procedure of 
our research, we find out that companies have discrimination and the data are not 
objective. Table 2 presents the total sample of our research after the subtraction of 
defective companies. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of observation by sector 
Distribution of observations by sector 
Sector Number of firms Percent 
Energy 80 5.8% 
Materials 93 6.7% 
Industry 206 15% 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
219 16% 
Consumer Stables 68 5% 
Health Care 149 10.9% 
Financial 197 14.3% 
Information 
Technology 
229 16.6% 
Utilities 56 4% 
Real Estate 79 5.7% 
Total 1376 100% 
Notes: The table consists of the total companies of research before the deduction of companies. 
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Table 2: Sample Collection Standards 
Sample Collection Standards 
Standard  Number of companies 
Total firms 1376 
Less  
Financial  (197) 
Companies with lacking data (358) 
Companies with missing data (139) 
Companies with not objective data (95) 
Final test sample 587 
 
By following the previous researches, we are in favor of introducing only larger and more 
successful firms in our research. To continue with, we expect that the variation in our 
earnings quality proxies will refuse to lead our research to more conservative results. It 
should be mentioned that during the selection process of companies, we have difficult to 
distinguish the companies which have managers as insiders. But it is known that insiders 
have both family and nonfamily companies. It is improper to believe that only large 
businesses have insider shares. Family businesses may not introduce greater transparency 
and reliability of disclosures. They have majority and minority shareholders and in order 
to take decisions family members at board have stronger opinion to decide. In order to 
understand the empirical model and the relationship between insiders and earnings 
quality, we have chosen the time period from 2011 to 2016 for our examination, despite 
the fact that we find out the data from 2007 to 2016 and we believed that the 2011 to 
2016 is the suitable period because it is more recent and it has not political and economic 
instabilities. 
Five-year information was requested from the Bloomberg Database for Insider Shares, 
Net Income, Size, Total Assets of firm, Long Term Debt to calculate Leverage, Net Sales, 
Property, Plant and Equipment, Code of companies (GICS) and ROA ratio. Most of the 
figures used for our demanding research, due to the fact that multiple functions were 
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used a large amount of data, were calculated as much of data were not available on 
Bloomberg Database.  
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5. Empirical Results 
 
This chapter will present the empirical results of our research, including the 
descriptive statistics on the dependent variables and the explanatory ones. Moreover, 
the chapter will provide the results of the correlations between the variables used. 
Then, we conclude with the findings of our regression analysis. 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables of each model are represented below.  The 
descriptive statistics of the sample in the abnormal accrual analysis are reported in 
table 3, panel A. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Abnormal Accruals Sample 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
ABS_ACC 6,367 2,727 5,000 0,058 12,455 
INSIDER 
SHARES 
5749521 528314 500000 0 16931409 
SIZE 8128136 1687479 1500000 1476063 3791165 
ROA 0,047 0,954 0,200 -1,702 0,783 
LEV 0,557 0,233 1,500 0,031 3,629 
GROWTH 0,0537 0,222 1,00 -0,813 8,906 
PPE 301559 1105914 25000 8 252668 
LOSS 0,880 0,323 0 0 1 
Notes: The table presents the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables of the sample which 
includes 1376 firms for the period 2007-2016. ABS_ACC are the dependent variables, INSIDER_SHARES 
is the main variable and SIZE, ROA, LEV, GROWTH and PPE consist some control variables. LOSS is 
dummy variable. All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
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Variables definition: 
ABS_ACCt = absolute value of abnormal accruals at t 
INSIDER_SHARESt = percentage of total common equity owned of managers 
SIZEt = natural log of total assets at t 
ROAt = net income at t divided by average total assets at t 
LEVt = firm leverage at t, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets  
GROWTH_SALESt = growth rate in sales at t 
PPEt = property, plant and equipment 
LOSS = one if net income<0, and zero otherwise 
 
We observe that the dependent variable, abnormal accruals, has a mean of 6,36 for 
the period of 2007 to 2016, with a minimum value of 0.058 and maximum 12,4. This 
is not surprising, because we have large businesses. The insider shares variable has 
mean 5,75 and standard deviation 5,28. To continue with, the Size give us the total 
value of companies with the mean 8128136 and standard deviation 1687479.The 
variable ROA present the profitability with mean 0,047 and standard deviation 0,95, 
this result show us that the beginning of financial crisis and the impact for our 
companies. The variable LEV has as mean 0,56 and standard deviation as 0,233. The 
variable GROWTH has mean 0,05 and standard deviation 0,22, that shows us the 
stability of companies during the chosen period. The variable PPE has mean 301559, 
standard deviation 1105914, the numbers are bigger than other variables because this 
variable consists of property plant and equipment. The variable LOSS is less reported 
to have wastage. 
 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the sample in the analysis of persistence 
of transitory losses.  
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B: Persistence of transitory losses sample 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
ΔΝΙt 
  
0,005 0,087 0,957 -0,611 1,819 
DΔNIt-1 
  
0,248 0,432 0 0 1 
ΔΝIt-1 
  
7,77 -0,001 0,998 -1,767 1,445 
INSIDER_SHARESt 
  
0,038 0,062 0,033 0,010 0,040 
SIZEt 
  
8,128 1,687 9,205 3,791 14,760 
LEVt 
  
0,557 0,233 1,423 0,031 3,629 
Notes: All numbers are rounded up to third decimal place. 
Variables definition: 
INSIDER_SHARESt = percentage of total common equity owned of managers 
SIZEt = natural log of total assets at t 
LEVt = firm leverage at t, measured by total liabilities divided by total assets  
ΔΝΙt = change in net income before extraordinary items at t, scaled by average total assets at t-1; 
ΔΝIt-1 = change in net income before extraordinary items at t-1, scaled by average total assets at t-1; 
DΔNIt-1 = one if ΔΝIt-1 < 0, and zero otherwise. 
 
 
The mean of change in income before extraordinary items ΔΝΙt is 0,005 in year t.The 
mean of DΔNIt-1 is 0,248. The descriptive statistics of insider shares (INSIDER_SHARESt 
), firm size (SIZEt) and leverage (LEVt) are comparable with those reported in panel A.  
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Concerning to the size of the firm variable, we expect a positive relation among 
earnings manipulation and the size of the firm due to the fact that the managers of 
bigger firms have more incentives to manipulate the reported earnings. 
 
The mean of the variable LEV which is the ratio of long-term debt to assets for our 
sample is 0,55. The assets of the sample companies are mostly funded by equity than 
debt and the companies are able to finance their operations and repay debts. There 
is no need for number’s manipulation which are related with the lenders. We expect 
a positive relation between earnings manipulation and the leverage ratio. The higher 
the leverage, the higher the incentives for earnings manipulation. 
 
 
5.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
The following step of our analysis consists of the calculation of the correlation 
coefficients among the variables of our investigation with the help of the Stata 
program. 
 
Now, we present the Correlation Matrix and the Pearson Pair wise coefficients for all 
the main variables used in our survey. If the number is positive, as one increases so 
does the other. On the other hand, if the number is negative, as one variable increases 
the other decreases. Every variable when correlate with itself, give us as result the 
number 1 because they do not have relationship.  
The correlation coefficient between our main explanatory variables INSIDER SHARES 
and SIZE is statistically significant at the 1% level. As we can notice in the table 3, 
abnormal accruals variable has negative relationship with the variable of profitability 
ROA, the growth of sales and the dummy variable LOSS. Specifically, the correlation 
coefficient between Abnormal Accruals and ROA is equal to -0.06, between Abnormal 
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Accruals and Growth of Sales is equal to -0.03 and between Abnormal Accruals and 
Loss is equal to -0.01. INSIDER SHARES variable has negative relationship with 
leverage, as a result, when insider shares increases, the leverage decreases and the 
correlation coefficient is equal to -0.004. This coefficient is near to zero, the difference 
is not big and the two variables are influenced one to other insignificantly. When the 
variable SIZE increases, the growth of sales decrease and the correlation coefficient is 
equal to -0.02. On the other hand, when return of assets(ROA) increases, LEV and PPE 
variables decrease and the correlation coefficients are equal to -0.10 and -0.005 
respectively. Between the Leverage and Growth of Sales have negative relationship 
and the correlation coefficient is equal to -0.06 and between Leverage and Loss is 
equal to -0.02, also they have negative correlation. Between Growth of Sales 
(GROWTH) and Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) have negative relationship and it 
is equal to -0.04. As we can observe, all other combination of variables is correlated 
positive and when one variable increases, the other increases and when one variable 
decreases, the other decreases. They affect the one to other positive. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Abnormal Accruals 
 ABS_
ACC 
INSIDER 
SHARES 
SIZE ROA LEV GROWTH PPE LOSS 
ABS_ 
ACC 
1        
INSIDER 
SHARES 
0.11 1       
SIZE 0.42 0.13 1      
ROA -0.06 0.02 0.03 1     
LEV 0.12 -0.01 0.46 -0.13 1    
GROWTH -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.22 -0.06 1   
PPE 0.49 0.20 0.48 -0.01 0.11 -0.04 1  
LOSS -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.61 -0.02 0.19 0.03 1 
Notes: All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place. 
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Following, we present the correlations among the variables in our model with the 
proxy of earnings. The Pearson Pair Wise correlation coefficients for all of major 
variables used in our investigation are shown in Table 4. 
 
The correlation coefficient between our main variables Insider Shares and change in 
Net Income is significant statistically at the 1% level. Exactly, the correlation 
coefficient between the variables Insider Shares and Change in Net income is 0,01. 
This result means that an increase or decrease of one variable by one, the same effect 
has the other. As far as it is concerned the variable Insider Shares and the change in 
Net Income for the previous year, the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.03. In this 
point, the two correlation variables are in the same direction. The correlation 
coefficient between Insider Shares and Change in Net Income the time t is nearly to 
zero and the correlation coefficient for the previous year is positive but nearly to zero. 
As a result, we have a meaningful decrease of correlation coefficient. This decrease 
depends on external factors which affect the value of Net Income. 
 
As far as it is concerned the correlation coefficient between the variable SIZE and the 
Change in Net Income at the time t (ΔΝΙt) is -0.03. These two variables are significant 
statistically at the 1% level. Analyzing the coefficient, it is expected that an increase 
(decrease) of one variable by one (1) unit will have negative interaction by the othe 
by 0.03 unit. The Size of the firm and the Change in Net Income are correlated 
negative. Generally, the Change in Net Income affects significant in the Size of the 
firm. From the previous year, the Change in Net Income and the Size of the firm are 
correlated positive and the correlation coefficient is equal to 0.01. This coefficient is 
weak because it is early to zero and it is not affected one to other. 
 
To continue with, the correlation coefficient between the Leverage (LEV) of the firm 
and the Change in Net Income at the time t is equal to -0.01. It is a weak negative 
coefficient between these two mean variables. The correlation coefficient between 
the Leverage of the firm and the Change in Net Income for the previous year is also 
negative and equal to -0.05.That means that the Leverage affects the same direction 
as Change in Net Income for the time t and the Change in Net Income for the previous 
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year. An increase or decrease of Leverage variable by one (1) unit has an opposite 
effect of 0.01 and 0.05 respectively.  
 
Following, examining correlation between the Insider Shares and the Size of firm , we 
observe that Insider Shares and SIZE is significant statistically at the 10% level. The 
correlation coefficient between two variables is equal to 0.13. To illustrate the 
correlation between those two variables, a decrease of 1 unit in the Insider Shares will 
affect a reduction to the size of the company by 0.13. 
 
Furthermore, to illustrate the correlation between Leverage (LEV) and the Size of the 
firm we observe that correlation coefficient between those two variables is very 
strong. A correlation coefficient of 0.43 means that LEV and SIZE are positive related, 
so an increase (decrease) in one (1) unit of one of these variables will cause an increase 
(decrease) of 0.43 to the other. The strong correlation coefficient between those two 
variables indicates also the kind of relation these two variables have, meaning that 
there have a strong relationship and the one is manipulated one to another with 
strong consequences to companies. 
 
To conclude with correlation, examining correlation coefficients between 
independent variables has the following results.  
We observe a strong correlation between the dummy variable multiplied with the 
Change in Net Income for previous year (DΔΝIt-1 * ΔΝIt-1) and the Size of Firm 
multiplied with the dummy variable and  the Change in Net Income for previous year 
(SIZE* ΔΝIt-1 * DΔΝIt-1 ). The correlation coefficient is equal to 0.98. On the other hand, 
the variable Size multiplied with the Change in Net Income( SIZE* * ΔΝIt-1 ) and the 
variable Size multiplied with the dummy variable (SIZE*DΔΝIt-1 ) are correlated 
negative. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is equal to -0.43. This 
coefficient is very strong and the one variable to another affects significant. As a 
consequence, if the one variable has a negative (positive) change by one unit, the 
other would be affected by 0.43 units positive (negative). The two variables have 
opposite direction. The following page presents the Table 6 and is the Correlation 
Matrix for persistence of transitory loss components. 
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ΔΝΙt DΔNIt
-1 
ΔΝIt-1 ΔΝIt-1 
∗ 
DΔNIt
-1 
INSIDER
_SHARE
St 
DΔNIt-
1∗INSIDER_SHA
RESt 
ΔΝIt-
1∗INSIDER_SH
ARESt 
ΔΝIt-
1∗DΔΝIt-1 
∗INSIDER_S
HARESt 
SIZEt DΔΝIt
-1 
∗SIZEt 
ΔΝIt-1 
∗SIZEt 
ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 
∗SIZEt   
LEV DΔΝIt-1 
∗LEVt 
ΔΝIt-1 ∗ 
LEVt 
ΔΝIt-1 
∗DΔΝIt-1∗ 
LEVt 
ΔΝΙt 
1,00 
               
DΔNIt-1 0,12 1,00 
              
ΔΝIt-1 -0,46 -0,44 1,00 
             
ΔΝIt-1 ∗ DΔNIt-1 -0,59 -0,35 0,81 1,00 
            
INSIDER_SHARESt 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,01 1,00 
           
DΔNIt-
1∗INSIDER_SHARESt 
0,01 0,08 -0,03 -0,02 0,56 1,00 
          
ΔΝIt-
1∗INSIDER_SHARESt 
-0,21 -0,12 0,30 0,30 0,20 -0,21 1,00 
         
ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 
∗INSIDER_SHARESt 
-0,27 -0,08 0,29 0,36 -0,15 -0,27 0,77 1,00 
        
SIZEt -0,03 -0,03 0,02 0,10 0,13 0,08 0,04 -0,02 1,00 
       
DΔΝIt-1 ∗SIZEt 
0,11 0,97 -0,40 -0,30 0,01 0,11 -0,12 -0,09 0,14 1,00 
      
ΔΝIt-1 ∗SIZEt 
-0,46 -0,46 0,98 0,80 0,01 -0,03 0,32 0,29 0,01 -0,43 1,00 
     
ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 ∗SIZEt   -0,58 -0,36 0,80 0,98 0,01 -0,02 0,31 0,37 0,05 -0,33 0,81 1,00 
    
LEV -0,01 0,01 -0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,05 -0,05 0,45 0,09 -0,05 -0,03 1,00 
   
DΔΝIt-1 ∗LEVt 0,11 0,88 -0,39 -0,31 -0,01 0,07 -0,13 -0,11 0,12 0,91 -0,42 -0,34 0,31 1,00 
  
ΔΝIt-1 ∗ LEVt 
-0,44 -0,30 0,79 0,73 0,00 -0,02 0,41 0,46 0,02 -0,28 0,80 0,74 -0,09 -0,36 1,00 
 
ΔΝIt-1 ∗DΔΝIt-1∗ LEVt 
-0,47 -0,21 0,62 0,78 0,00 -0,01 0,40 0,50 0,04 -0,19 0,62 0,78 -0,15 -0,29 0,92 1,00 
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Notes: ΔΝΙt is equal to the change in net income before extraordinary items at t, scaled by average total 
assets at t-1,ΔΝIt-1 means the change in net income before extraordinary items at t-1, scaled by average 
total assets at t-1 and the dummy variable DΔNIt-1 is one(1) if ΔΝIt-1 is smaller that zero(0), and zero 
otherwise. All numbers are rounded up to second decimal place. 
 
 
5.3 Multivariate Results 
 
The next tables present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method for more in-depth 
results, due to the fact that descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, concerning 
univariate relations among variables, are not enough.  
5.3.1 Insider Ownership and Abnormal Accruals 
 
The results in table 7 are from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression using the 
absolute value of abnormal accruals as the dependent variable. 
Table 7: Regression Analysis  
Independent 
Variable 
Expected Sign Coefficient 
t-statistic 
(P-value) 
INSIDER SHARES 
 
_ -0,14 
 
-0,1663 
(0,008) 
SIZE 
 
- -0,006 -2,697*** 
(0,000) 
ROA 
 
? 0,1221 1,014 
(0,175) 
LEV 
 
+ -0,030 -0,1221*** 
(0.000) 
GROWTH 
 
+ 0,029 0,742 
(0,000) 
PPE 
 
+ 0,1301 3,754*** 
(0,0003) 
LOSS 
 
+ 0,1911 0,4835*** 
(0,000) 
F-value 
 
53,41 
Adj. R2 
 0,132 
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The results of our regression help us to cover the gap that descriptive statistics and 
correlations left on the association between earnings management and insiders’ 
ownership. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant. The adjusted R2 value 
is 0,132.  
 
Throughout this study, the p-values of the independent variables are two-tailed values 
calculated based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. The signs 
of the independent variables’ coefficients are basically in line with our predictions 
about the expected signs and prior literature.  Specifically, the coefficient on 
INSIDER_SHARES is -0,14 with a p-value < 0,001, suggesting that insiders report a 
lower level of abnormal accruals. The coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant at 
p < 0,01 or lower. The result indicates that large firms and abnormal accruals are 
negatively related. The bigger the firm the lower the abnormal accruals. The 
coefficients on growth rate (GROWTH) and negative income (LOSS) are positive, 
indicating that firms with higher growth rate and firms with negative income are 
associated with higher abnormal accruals. Despite the predictions, the coefficient on 
leverage (LEV) is negative and significant at p < 0,001, consistent with evidence by 
Cheng and Warfield 2005, who also report a negative relation between leverage and 
abnormal accruals. So, a reduction (increase) of the value of a firm’s leverage, would 
bring out an increase (decrease) in the value of firm’s abnormal accruals.  
 
Moreover, the low R2 does not indicate a bad fit of the model to the observations. It 
could be an indicator that other explanatory variables, different from ours, may 
influence more our independent variables.  
 
To draw a conclusion, the aforementioned judgements give us evidence that the 
hypotheses of our dissertation can be confirmed. This means that insiders’ ownership 
is systematically related with the quality of earnings. Also, our hypotheses, is fitted in 
our descriptive statistics analysis, correlation matrix, and regression analysis results.  
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5.3.2 Insider Ownership and Persistence of Transitory Loss Components 
 
The quality of financial reporting of a firm is considered to be higher when transitory 
loss components in earnings are less persistent into future periods than transitory gain 
components (Ball and Shivakumar 2005a, Basu 1997). The following table indicates 
the outcome of the analysis of persistence of transitory losses.  
 
Table 8: Regression Analysis 
Independent Variable Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic 
(P-value) 
DΔNIt-1 
 
? -0,0567 0,172 
(0,367) 
ΔΝIt-1 
 
0 0,046 0,592*** 
(0,001) 
DΔNIt-1 ∗ ΔΝIt-1 
 
- -0,958 0,691*** 
(0,006) 
INSIDER_SHARESt ? 1,440 0,668 
(0,043) 
DΔNIt-1 * INSIDER_SHARESt 
 
? -4,120 0,099 
(0,65) 
ΔΝIt-1 * INSIDER_SHARESt ? 2,550 0,957 
(0,005) 
DΔNIt-1 ∗ ΔΝIt-1 *  INSIDER_SHARESt 
 
? -4,240 1,014 
(0,018) 
SIZEt 
 
? -0,002 0,807 
(0,024) 
DΔNIt-1* SIZEt 
 
? 0,005 0,943 
 (0,000) 
ΔΝIt-1 * SIZEt 
 
? 0,008 0,495 
(0,002) 
DΔNIt-1 ∗ ΔΝIt-1 *  SIZEt ? 0,009 0,501 
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 (0,167) 
LEVt 
 
? -0,003 0,500 
(0,067) 
DΔNIt-1  * LEVt 
 
? 0,012 3,163*** 
(0,039) 
ΔΝIt-1 * LEVt 
 
? -0,234 0,232 
(0,133) 
DΔNIt-1 ∗ ΔΝIt-1 * LEVt 
 
? 0,247 0,254 
(0,035) 
R2 0,128 
 
The prediction for the coefficient on ΔΝIt-1∗DΔNIt-1 is negative due to the fact that 
transitory loss components are less persistent than transitory gains (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005, Basu 1997). The coefficient on ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1 ∗INSIDER_SHARESt is -
4,120 with a p-value of 0,018. The negative coefficient indicates that higher insider 
ownership is associated with less persistence of transitory losses. The coefficient on 
ΔΝIt-1∗DΔNIt-1 is -0,958 and the p-value is 0,006. Overall, these results indicate that 
family firms are conservative in reporting transitory losses. So, earnings of insider 
ownership firms are of high quality.  
 
The coefficient on ΔΝIt-1∗DΔΝIt-1∗SIZEt is positive and significant at p < 0,05, indicating 
that larger firms are less conservative in reporting transitory losses. The coefficient on 
ΔΝIt-1 ∗DΔΝIt-1∗ LEVt variable is negative and significant, indicating that firms with 
higher ratio of leverage is associated with less persistent transitory losses.  
 
In summary, the outcome in the abnormal accruals’ analysis and the analysis of 
persistence of transitory losses show that insider ownership is associated with greater 
earnings quality.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This dissertation examines the potential effect of insider ownership on earnings quality in 
USA. For this purpose, we selected data using Bloomberg database, for a sample of 587 
companies. Years under scrutiny were from 2011 until 2016 and the results which we met 
were in the same direction as other researchers’ studies. We attempted to observe insider 
ownership and we measured earnings quality with two different methods: absolute value 
of abnormal accruals and persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. The 
empirical findings indicate that the insider ownership of these companies have an impact 
on earnings quality. 
 
Existing literature indicates that two conflicting statements are occurring on the effects of 
insiders’ ownership on earnings quality. The first one states that insiders’ ownership could 
irritate earnings quality, while the second view argues that insiders ownership could 
prohibit earnings management activities and in turn improve earnings quality. As it is stated 
the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect are the two contradicting existing 
theories which affect the demand and supply of earnings quality. The entrenchment effect 
states that the wealth of other investors may be expropriated by insiders through the supply 
of lower earnings quality. The supply of lower earnings quality may be mitigated by the 
demand for higher earnings quality by other users of financial statements if they recognize 
that the corporate governance is weak. However, the alignment effect states that insider 
ownership aligns the interests of insiders with those of outside investors and this leads to 
earnings of higher quality. The supply of higher earnings quality may be attenuated by the 
lower demand for higher earnings quality if users of financial statements take it for granted 
that these firms have stronger corporate governance.  
 
Especially, our study documents evidence that, on average, insiders’ ownership is 
systematically related with higher earnings quality. The outcome is robust to two measures 
of earnings quality: abnormal accruals and persistence of transitory loss components in 
earnings. In addition, we examine the relation using descriptive statistics analysis, 
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correlation matrices and regression analysis.  
 
However, our survey is subject to several limitations. First of all, a major limitation of this 
research is that the assumptions apply only to large publicly traded firms in the United 
States. In other countries, outside the United States, the results based on this survey may 
not be valid.  
 
Second, our models consist of control variables which are included in a large number of 
similar studies. However, there are different variables which can be used and measure an 
alternative impact of insider ownership on earnings quality. Our findings and limitations 
could provide a basis for future further research. Moreover, a future research could add 
more categories of ownership structure and study the results on earnings quality with more 
measures.  
 
Another limitation which should be taken into consideration is the fact that USA still 
emerging of the 2008 global financial crisis that began there. Multiple effects have affected 
companies operating in the United States of America because they are not able to operate 
in full capacity. The effects consist a limitation for our study due to the fact that the 
environment is distressed and the findings may mirroring this in their correlation between 
insider ownership structure and the quality of earnings. 
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